The Occasional Dissident

“We have shed blood together and that is a bond that no man can break.”
- U.S. General Ray Odierno in remarks to British troops working toward an end to their six-year occupation of Iraq (“U.S. Takes Control of Basra Base,” Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, April 1, 2009)

“I am going to drink their blood.” 
- Khalil Ibrahim al-Sammarai describing his plans for his son’s killers (“A Quiet Filled With Wariness,” Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, February 26, 2009)

Four thousand, three hundred and twenty-one.  Please, dear citizens, count them all.  The numbers—4, 3, 2, 1—count down as if heralding our departure, an exit from an occupation that should never have happened, an exit that came far later than it should have.  These are the lives that committed themselves to protecting us and that were instead sacrificed to a useless war and to protect worthless egos.  Michael Gerson, former speech-writer for George Bush and stalwart defender of the 2007 “surge” in Iraq writes in the Washington Post, “If America had retreated then, it would have been a failure of our will and a failure of our military” (“Stepping Down to Success,” July 3, 2009).  Gerson, one of the many Bush administration members who never donned a uniform, played a very active role in ensuring those who would subordinate their safety for that of our nation had a chance to sacrifice everything, including their lives, in Iraq.  Gerson was the genius behind the “axis of evil” lie that made American voters perceive a threat from Iraq where none existed.  He perpetrated a fraud that cost us 4,321 Americans—all better than he.  His suggestion that the military, “our military,” might have failed in Iraq is self-serving and shameless.  He deserves all the criticism you can throw at him.  The failures in Iraq belong to him and the Bush administration, never to our military.

Dear citizens, decades ago, when I was younger and a great deal more foolish, I joined a group of my friends—all young enlisted members in the Air Force—on a weekend camping trip.  We set up camp on a beach about one-hundred-and-fifty miles south of Tokyo and did what college-age kids do when far from home and supervision.  On one evening, a few friends had enough drink in them to engage in a small brawl.  The fight consisted almost in equal measure those engaged in earnest fighting and those of us engaged in restoring peace.  Telling one from another at any given moment was difficult.  I latched on to a friend, Randy, and held him back.  He was determined to throw a punch and struggled to get away.  Eventually, I had to wrestle him to the ground to keep him from hurting others and to prevent him from being hurt.  I did nothing to deflate his anger.  While I held him, he fought to break free and land a punch.  Had I released him, he would have swung freely.  Only when the principles in the fight had made peace, signaled with a handshake and—always bewildering—a warm embrace that only two men with bloody noses can share, could I release Randy.  Luckily for me, his desire to fight did not outlast my ability to hold him down.

I learned two things from this experience.  I can, if I apply enough physical and mental pressure, prevent or deter some violence.  As long as I pushed down on my friend hard and long enough, he would not be fighting.  I also learned that physical force did nothing to change his attitude.  Randy was still willing to swing away.  Only the outbreak of peace—hardly a matter of my control with my arms around a struggling belligerent—had dissuaded Randy from clocking someone.  The surge of combat troops in Iraq has taught us exactly the same lesson and no more.  We can, if we exert enough force, greatly reduce opponents’ ability to engage in violence even as they struggle to break free of our control.  We cannot end violence this way.  We cannot, despite our best efforts, achieve a lasting peace by this method alone. General Odierno’s efforts to “spill blood” have not ended Mr. al-Sammarai’s desire to taste the blood of revenge.  The General does not have the means to end this.  He does not have the tools to eliminate the sources of these conflicts—the Sunni-Shi’a theological disagreement, for example—only the tools to restrain some manifestations of them.  As I have argued previously, military force is a poor hammer for building a peaceful future.  Again, this is a failure of Gerson and Bush and their administration, not a failure of our military.

In Iraq, [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike] Mullen acknowledged that violence has increased significantly in recent weeks, but he said that was unlikely to affect the U.S. plan to withdraw all combat troops from that country by August 2010.  (“Afghan Effort Is Mullen’s Top Focus,” Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, May 5, 2009.)

There is another consideration that bears inspection.  The received wisdom in the United States, especially among proponents of the surge, is that our presence has placed a ceiling on the violence—ignoring that the precipitous drop in “enemy-initiated attacks” took place immediately after the anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his forces to lay down their arms.  This, more obviously than the surge, seems to have been the largest factor in the lower number of deaths among Americans and may have contributed to the more gradual reduction among Iraqis.  We must allow, as I have asserted previously, that the presence of U.S. troops also may be placing a floor under the violence in Iraq, that violence occurs because we are there.  That contribution, that very negative contribution, may be more significant than any ceiling we hope to provide.

“The American military presence brought nothing to our streets but destruction and chaos,” said Omar al-Dulaimi, 57, a government employee who lives near the Um al Khoura mosque, one of the largest Sunni places of worship in the capital.  “We had nothing from them but tension and confusion.  It’s much better for us and for them if they stay in their bases now,” (“Pointing to a new era, U.S. pulls back as Iraqis vote,” Alissa J. Rubin, International Herald Tribune, February 1, 2009.)

We are not becoming aware of this just now, and I am not asserting a strange new idea.

Iraqis of all sectarian and ethnic groups believe that the U.S. military invasion is the primary root of the violent differences among them, and see the departure of “occupying forces” as the key to national reconciliation, according to focus groups conducted for the U.S. military last month.  (“All Iraqi Groups Blame U.S. Invasion for Discord, Study Shows,” Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, December 19, 2007.)

Everything we hear from the only elected branch of Iraq’s government—the Council of Representatives—tells us that Iraqi’s sense of sovereignty and grievances against Western domination in the past century will make the long-term U.S. presence a source of violence, not stability.  In fact, members of the Iraqi parliament who testified before Congress last month told us that if there was a clear timetable for withdrawal, the warring factions would lose much of their rationale, and public support, for attacking each other and U.S. forces.  (“The Wrong Partnership for Iraq,” Rep. Bill Delahunt, D-MA, and Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-CT, Washington Post, July 8, 2008.)

The attitudes of Iraqi citizens naturally affect the acts of their leaders.

“The Iraqi government has no intention to accept the presence of any foreign troops or bases after 2011,” said [Dr.] Ali al-Dabbagh, a government spokesman.  (“12,000 U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq,” Anthony Shadid, Washington Post, March 9, 2009.)

Dear citizens, the most peaceful year for our troops in Iraq took place over the past twelve months.  This period began when the Iraqi government, angered by the positions of the Bush administration during negotiations over the current security pact, began demanding openly a U.S. exit.  In the end, President Bush agreed to the removal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, an event the Iraqis held us to, and to the removal of all our forces from Iraq by the end of 2011.  With modest adjustments, this is now the Obama plan for dealing with Iraq.  However, there may be one last modification of this pact.  The agreement requires that Iraqis approve its terms in a national referendum due this July 30th.  If the Iraqi citizens reject the agreement, we must be out within a year.  Iraqi political leaders are not speaking out in favor of the agreement.

“Most Iraqis know very well they need the Americans, but nobody wants to say ‘yes, we want the security agreement,’” said Ghassan al-Attiya, director of Iraq Foundation for Democracy and Development in London.

“This is an election year for Iraq; no one wants to appear that he is appeasing the Americans,” he said.  “Anti-Americanism is popular now in Iraq.”  (“Iraq Moves Ahead With Vote on U.S. Security Pact,” Alissa J. Rubin, New York Times, June 10, 2009.)

Dear citizens, as I sit at my computer typing this, some of you are putting matches to fuses and firing off rockets to celebrate our brave Declaration of Independence from British rule.  Earlier this week, on June 30, 2009, Iraqis celebrated their independence with no less relish—independence from us.  We must note that on June 28, 2004, two days ahead of schedule, Paul Bremmer, our viceroy in Iraq, handed over “sovereignty” to the Iraqis.  That event was a cruel joke celebrated only by Bremmer flying over Baghdad in a helicopter on his flight from the country.  We were told, quite incorrectly it turned out, that the Iraqis would welcome us into Iraq as liberators, that they would throw flowers at our feet.  Now, they are celebrating liberation as our boots are marching outward.  They are delighted with our departure.  That truth is difficult to accept, but it is the truth nonetheless.  Iraqis want and need us out.  Sovereignty, as the Iraqis understand very well, means Iraqis ruling Iraq.  It means city streets cleared of armed and armored foreign troops.  It means a reduction, as Mr. al-Dulaimi put it, in our “tension and confusion.”

The Washington Post quotes Vice President Biden on his current trip to Baghdad explaining a new American attitude.  In the United States, Biden claims, there “wasn’t any appetite to put Humpty Dumpty back together again if, by the actions of people in Iraq, it fell apart” (“Biden Warns of Ending Commitment,” July 4, 2009).  Except, of course, the Iraqis did not engage each other with guns and bombs and blood on their own.  The fights between insurgents and collaborators, between Iraqis and al Qaeda, between Sunni and Shi’a, Sunni and Sunni, Shi’a and Shi’a, these all came after and as a result of the U.S. invasion.  Each Iraqi is responsible for his or her own violence, but the environment that makes them feel compelled to engage in violence—the chaos in Iraq—that was delivered to the country by American military power wielded by an immoral White House, by a war of choice, a war of aggression.  We have a responsibility to end this.  Ending it requires two steps: our departure, already in progress, and our advocacy for more involvement by Iraq’s neighbors.

But, I wonder if we can get to step two.  I have advocated since late 2006 for an Iraq Transitional Assistance Group to bring Iraq’s neighbors into a cooperative effort to stabilize the country and to build confidence.  Although the Iraqi government is linking with its neighbors on security and economic issues, the need for confidence-building measures remains unmet.  Corinne Reilly, writing for the Merced Sun-Star, describes the plight of Iraqi refugees trying to return to their homes.  She notes the worry of Muthhir Mohammad, returning from Syria.  “As a Sunni Muslim, he said, he doesn’t trust Iraq’s government and security forces, which are mostly Shiite Muslim,” (“Iraqi refugees return but life is still a struggle,” May 25, 2009).  My desk is covered in newspaper clippings and printings of on-line stories depicting the myriad challenges like this that remain: the arrests of Sunni Awakening leaders that threaten to push Sunnis back into an alliance with al Qaeda, the divisions in and fights over Mosul and Kirkuk, and even a fight over reparations between Kuwait and Iraq, the former demanding the rest of the payments for the 1990 invasion, a member of the parliament in the latter demanding four trillion dollars for Kuwait’s role in facilitating our invasion.  Arbiters who understand Iraq and Iraqis should play a role in easing along a lengthy reconciliation process.  That necessary role is one we cannot fill.  We have never had the language and cultural fluency in adequate amounts to aid the Iraqis.  Our reputation in Iraq is tainted by sanctions and invasion and occupation.  And the Iraqis seem no longer interested in our assistance, perhaps in any assistance.

“We made it clear that national reconciliation is an Iraqi issue and involvement of a non-Iraqi party won’t make it more successful,” said government spokesman [Dr.] Ali al-Dabbagh.  (“Iraq declines offer of U.S. help with reconciliation,” Andrew Quinn, Reuters.com, July 4, 2009.)

Of course, in the end, Iraq will be peaceful only if Iraqis make it so.  And, clearly, we have been unable to resolve the underlying issues that lead to bloodshed in Iraq’s streets.  From the start, there has been only one fight we can end—the resistance to our occupation.  That we must do, without fail, by continuing our march out of Iraq.  Four thousand, three hundred and twenty-one lost lives deserve that we get at least that right.

- Alan Howe, July 4, 2009